

On Some Alternatives to the Code in the Age of Hyperreality; the Hermit and the City-dweller.

John Young and Terry Blake

"The history of the nature of Western art corresponds to the change of the nature of truth."

(Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*)

1. Introduction

Heidegger clearing a path through the Black Forest and Wittgenstein prowling back and forth through the streets of London both explore such a "change in the nature of truth" and warn of the pitfalls for those who do not know their way about.

In art we also have the meeting of the ways of the hermit and the city-dweller. The two cultures of art and science are plunged into a "crisis of truth" which has been variously called "the Post-Modern Condition", "Epistemological Anarchism", "the Beaubourg Effect".

The predominant reflex of those art theorists who do not simply ignore the new condition is one of failure of nerve. Not competent to discuss the philosophical issues (still less to respond to them) they take cover in the stance of a librarian who simply catalogues the different positions without taking sides.

Baudrillard¹ describes this truth-crisis as a collapse of those bodies of concepts that seemed to provide universal standards for legitimating our practices (in art, science/politics). In our time such last-ditch attempts at resurrecting some universal principle as Marxism, Surrealism, Psychoanalysis, Semiotics and Conceptualism themselves collapse in the general movement of dissuasion embodied in such cultural monuments as Beaubourg.

* "The Post-Modern Condition" (Lyotard), "Epistemological Anarchism" (Feyerabend), "The Beaubourg Effect" (Baudrillard)

1, In *"The Beaubourg Effect"* (L'efft Beaubourg, Editions Galilee, Paris 1977) also the author of *The Mirror of Production*, Telos 1976 and *Forget Foucault* Editions Galilee, Paris 1977.

2. What is this thing called "Beaubourg"?

Beaubourg is a hyper-museum - the objects of art are contained in a space that makes them all equal, objects of fascination. To get in, it must be art. Inside it is transformed - it is just one more object: a particle circulating in a compact mass of "other" particles. Like the people - not individuals but a mass circulating and touching everything indifferently - any message is received, as a spectacle.

But Beaubourg is itself just another museum through which the "works" circulate indifferently - another *medium* (like film, video . . .) that *includes* all. Its action is automatic - any fixed code loses its power by being put side by side with any other. Any "person" becomes a little Beaubourg - a cool receiver, a black box, a spectator whose eye embraces anything, an auditor whose ear listens to it all, without sorting. William Burroughs and John Cage (including his latest piece played through *Finnegan's Wake* at Beaubourg) are relays of the "Beaubourg Effect" - the invisible man and the mushroom collector who *also* produce art: by cut-ups and change; who also produce consciousness: omni-attentive awareness, care for the smallest. The hermit leaves the mass, where he is anyone, to become - no-one. Maybe, he leaves society to become mass.

In a Black Hole all pathways lead to the implosive centre. The path of the hermit and the path of the mass, of the forest-dweller and the city-dweller, lead to the same point - the point of indifference. Conforming to the code, to a privileged system of concepts and values, is futile - there are too many.

3. The Codes

For Baudrillard, Western civilization has entered the age of hyperreality, existence based on the superficial ventilation, circuiting of codes, rather than the *meaning* in primitive symbolic exchange. Any referent can no more be considered in terms of use-value as a "revolution" in under-arm deodorants be comprehensible in the 19th century. Our romance once with the metaphysical reference points object and use-value, production, labour and nature, came out of an anthropology of man as conqueror of nature and its ecological disasters - a metaphysical overdetermination of man as producer (the code of the system of political economy).

Today, strategies of control fall into binary modes, signifying practices quite often operate by binary logic, the logic of distinction, opposition and exclusion - examples of this can be found in economic and political systems, opposing parties, for example, in fact ensure a more stable form of control than monopolies, dictatorships. These *signifying* practices are also governed by the process of *abstraction* - local concepts become universalized into absolutes - the course of metaphysics. The absolute form of the code circulates free from its referent, its 'object reality' or material alibi (the use-value of underarm deodorants for example is merely a post-facto justification for the existence of the signifier).²

2. The notion of the 'reality' as alibi for the signifier can also be found in epistemology, in Kuhn's demonstration that scientists 'solve puzzles' within a paradigm rather than confront an untheorised reality. (In *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, IEUS, Vol. 2, No.2. 1970)

Values in society are becoming un-decidable - the era of simulation, of simulating undecidable values is imminent. "The distinction between the beautiful and the ugly in fashion, of left or right in politics, of truth or falsehood in the messages of the media, of the useful and the useless at the level of objects, of nature and culture at all levels of signification are cancelled (Exchange p.92). For the process now involves the universalization of previously decidable values, drawing them to become the "truth referents", within their indeterminacy, values have become self-referential. In the binary system there is the illusion of sustaining a decidability, when in fact it proposes the imminent on/off structure.

The code refers to its own logic and becomes an absolute reference, its truth. In advanced Capitalism, language does not function on the representation model, representing 'reality', commodity carefully weighted by use-value, since there is no more correspondence between word and object. Only the abstract, discontinuous manipulation of the code and its reproduction exists.³ We consume not an object but an element in a code. And code is not ideology, since after all, the code is hiding nothing, not even a final instance of an "economic real".

A set of concepts may take on the form of a universal and exclusive account of beings. It becomes a fixed code which conforms to certain typical epistemological attributes:

1. Monism: as description of a single reality, it cannot tolerate alternative accounts.
2. Binary logic: as reality is determinate, it can be described by a system of binary choices.
3. Realism: Reality is prior to signifying systems but is described by them.

The code is the metaphysical structure of our practices. At any one time there are many codes, each claiming to be *the* Code. For our signs are vulnerable and the quest for certainty continues.

The code tells us what everything is, where it belongs and how it all fits together. It describes and prescribes in the same breath. In the domain of art, the code specifies the nature of the domain and its elements. (For instance, art as representation involving artist, intention, art-object, pre-existent reality, audience).

Our era is the era of the obsession with different signifying systems, for their own sake, an obsession with ever new codes, which at times requires various post-facto "natural and material" justification for its existence. This obsession is governed by the process of simulation with such codes, yet there is not a sense of identity or judgement, unlike ideology with its backdrop ultimate 'real', we are as it were the same side of the mobius strip as the code is on, in the process of simulacra

3 In the system of political economy, Baudrillard shows that "there is not only a quantitative exploitation of man as productive force by the system of capitalistic political economy, but a metaphysical overdetermination of man as producer by the code of the political economy" (Mirror of Production p. 21)

4. *Hyperconformism*

Conformism as a strategy moves within an assumption of self as thing to be adapted to a set of norms. The critical doublethink of "Other people conform, I subvert from within" (the avant-garde) does not break out of this paradigm which is basically one; of power as *code*, that is, as privileged grid of analysis. But the Beaubourg Effect shows up even in the realm of theory, as we enter the phase of the circulation of *codes*.

Hyperconformism is the irony of a readiness to conform *too* much, of a willingness to conform to anything. The pagan who is willing to worship Christ to excess, the artist who churns out only the latest fashion, the craftsman devoted to the canons of the craft, the thinker who excels in repudiating positions that no-one ever held - are willing to be fascinated to the point of themselves becoming pure spectacle.

In Australia, there seems to be a difficulty, a tension in the system, in its reproduction of the code-yet, because even language, because of the spaces between us, becomes functional, all the more, the code and the language of political economy, that of production and nature, seem to repress its reality with greater ease. The drama between city dweller and hermit, and in art that which recognises the code (what is defined as art and what constitute its domain at a certain stage) and that which recognises traditional craft (yet another code), becomes interpreted in humanist discourses as a drama between *ideologies* (the contemporary artist and the artist-craftsman) (with the 'underlying real' based on functionalist productionism). However, we can discern this distinction as yet another instance of the binary nature of the code belonging to a hyperrealistic system.

We have, indeed, ample practices dealing successfully with a historical, national art perspective. There is a tendency towards expertise, and the production of historicity and documentational rhetoric (whether it be in language or photographic works), whether it is based on class analysis, production, or the capillary nature of power. The critical forces of art, we are coming to see, are imbedded in artists becoming experts; Lawrence Weiner (like Hans Haacke *et al.*) has shifted from conceptual art to become the Hero of colonized artists. And historical research for him (e.g. his later studies of Monets and their exchange to different ownerships; he subsequently showed the studies as works) belongs to the realm of economy, of art institutions. But we might also discern yet a different course - that the description of the *circulation* of Monet to different ownership's shows not only that an art object is 'only' considered in terms of control by an anthropocentralised institution of ownership, or the valourization of Weiner himself as an expert researcher in the held of art-politics, as these are indeed matters of content but that this Beaubourg thing depends on a superficial ventilation, if not only the object art work, but also its researchers, that it is indifferent even to analysis and historicity.

6. In the domain of art criticism we see in pure form the "game with the code" that is, the attempt to treat the code itself as object of fascination. Marxists and Foncaultians (usually apostate Marxists) become so captivated by their new theories that they begin to establish that very "supermarket of ideas" that they denounce. The spectacle of so many aging theorists suddenly advertising "Buy new improved PRACTICE" makes the day that much closer

when everything will be practice.

7. In a strategic space defined by the Code itself, the death of the Code announces itself in various strategies of opposition or transcendence - the naive anarchism of the manic, the nihilism of the Dandy, and the skepticism of the librarian.

The Manic. Artists themselves tend to respond to the "death of art" with a manic performance of anarchy conceived as a simple opposite of the old cultural regime. "Anything goes" becomes the slogan for the repetitive monotony of Neo-Neo-Dada and Post-Conceptualism. The myth of 'Dada' informs an oeuvre of strange or enigmatic gestures that connote only their own status of opposition to the Code.

The Dandy. But this manic delight in shocking the world including oneself shades into another established strategy-dandyism, ". . . the delight in causing astonishment, and the proud satisfaction of never oneself being astonished" (Baudelaire). This proud strategy of detaching oneself from the Code elevates a certain pose of irony and scepticism. It escapes the naive swing from Order to Chaos by an ascent to a more "realistic" meta-level.

The Librarian. In the art critics we can see a similar response to the collapse of the values that made criticism possible. A naive cowboy-Marxism inverts the poles of the critical Code (like the manic artist) or a more sophisticated "After-the-Post-Critic" approach signals loudly that it has seen through all that, and is now down to the hard work of a non-moralistic analysis and genealogy of rhetoric and discourses.

From the position of avant-gardism, the attempt to step ahead of the silent majority lags behind its realization because of the implosive nature of Beaubourg, a willingness to accept any cultural norms (including the sociality of the People's Republic in the latest Venice Biennale, "just another neo-classical pavillion"). The attempt to be ahead of this implosion, avant-gardism, can be seen not only in terms of new norms of sociality or sexuality, but also in epistemological terms. Indeed, this is evident "in successful arguments against the chauvinist cognitive dominance of science in favour of the equal capabilities of art to contribute epistemologically to the production of alternative world pictures etc. (as in various arguments derived from Gombrich, Wollheim and Goodman). Yet if art as epistemological positions is seen as an avant-garde; as cubism was once seen, Beaubourg by its implosion prevents such attempts at a definitive epistemological chauvinism (as that of cubism) to establish itself as a subversive analytic code, as a violent act of explosion. It must exist along, circulating indifferently - a particle in brownian motion. This sort of rhetoric in epistemology can be found in Feyerabend's⁴ principle of 'anything goes' which does not mean as it is more than often mistaken to mean- no method, therefore nothing goes⁵ (the manic) but rather, any rules, any method, any tradition and any form of life - the cancellation of any non-arbitrary criterion for the cognitive ranking of different knowledge traditions (such as witchcraft, voodoo, Chinese medicine,

4. Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method* NLB 1975,

5. This term of Pyrrhonian scepticism is a process, a counter-argument against dogmatic positions, it is not a doctrine, a code. It is not a simple minded appositional anarchism "If anything goes, Hitler goes" as exclaimed by Academic leftists who see the principle as dogma.

Lysenko, etc. including what is generally known as art, as in Sontag's words (!), art is a form of thinking'.⁶

8. This superficial ventilation, this movement of implosion of all projects in art and other cultural norms into the monument of anti-culture, Beaubourg, more than often leads to attempts of being somehow in "advance" of this implosion, but this can only lead to a nihilism of the death of X (where X = art. society, power, knowledge, white-people, meat-eaters, etc.) as *task* or the Dandyism (à la Duchamp) of playing in a negative cultural space joyfully alarmed as such. And this Dandyism does not 'show', it is not the land of silence which Sontag, borrowing from Wittgenstein, fifteen years ago⁷ described as "the activity of the mystic must end in a **via negative**, a theology of God's absence, a craving for the cloud of unknowing beyond knowledge and for the silence beyond speech, so art must tend toward anti-art the elimination of the "subject" (the "object" the "image") the substitution of chance (or any other term⁸) for intention, and pursuit of silence"⁹ This we might see belonging to the case of Sol LeWitt in art and Steve Reich or Philip Glass, or even his "father" Cage in music). This Dandyism is the sort that artists, "discovering that one has nothing to say, one seeks a way to say **that**" - although once a strategy for improving audience's experience 'for the conceptual, it has now turned into an institutional strategy, subjectivist; a simulacrum, of the **humanist** element in the Code.¹⁰

Indeed, Duchamp's Dandyism, his chess playing is unlike the hermit mushroom collector (Cage). Not only is chess playing an intellectual credential, but to play chess is to play **with** someone via rules, and to use this, perhaps as an hint, as certain relation (either by analogy or contrast) with his serious but enigmatic art games or jokes, both activities as it were, wanting to be clarified in terms of communication, both demanding a 'receiver' reinforces the myth of communication. Perhaps, the enigmatic side of Duchamp should have been better off playing out the rules of chess with no-one - a no-one, a hermit mushroom collector.

9. Naive Anarchism and Genealogical Empiricism (in art and art theory)

Nothing is easier than to apply the binary patterns of the code to react to the

6. Notions of progress in art which attempt to generate supremacy of some art practices over others (whether it be cultural or inter-cultural) are only the next obvious move of the cognitive dominance of scientism now *applied* in the arts: "Now that the arts have been recognized to have cognitive features, maybe we can say: "Art is cognitive science is progress, anything which resembles the patterns of the psycho-scientific thought in the arts is obviously superior to those other art forms" - and we progress to examining those levels of progress" - extremely stupid as tins may seem, this position or its binary structure "by bringing tins controversial notion into discussion" is valued by some critics.
7. In "The Aesthetics of Silence" in *Styles of Radical Will* Farrar, Straus and Giroux New York 1966.
8. My addition, since the case of Lewitt is an ultra-rationalism in the strategy of his silence (from the grid works to "Statues: A Melodrama", square photographs with implied grids), not unlike 'logic and the sayable' and 'the mystical, the non-sense' in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.
9. "The Aesthetics of Silence" Part I,
10. In the seventies, this was placed under differing labels from body action, to "psychic manifestation in pictures", "psychotic art", of "individual mythologies", "personal confrontation with the psyche" etc, either through a seriousness of ritual involvement or with ironic distance.

code's death. The Code is Law and Order so its death must mean anarchy and chaos. The Code is objective and communicable, so its death must be the triumph of subjectivity and the proliferation of private languages. The Code is the subjugating of multiplicities to unities, so its death must be signified by a work that looks as plural as possible - the *crowded* multiplicity.

Each of these short-circuits conceives of an Other to the Code - but as a principle, i.e. on the model of the code. Unable to go beyond the binary choices of Humanism, "anything goes" becomes receded in terms of a Homanlic ego endlessly signifying its own freedom, subjectivity, and multiplicity.

Like the naive anarchists, described by Feyerabend, they think that the death of the Code (e.g. of Method) reduces the possibilities to one (chaos) or to many incommunicable works (private languages). But Feyerabend is able to describe a possibility he calls "Epistemological Anarchism" or "Pluralism" which does not *suspend* the old methods but merely their universal and coercive force. He supplements them with a sketch of various procedures (such as counter-induction, proliferation) and recommends a new use of these methods - an anarchistic *use* which is not bound by them rather than a chaotic abandonment of all rules.

In art theory, those who would avoid a simple inversion of the Code rouse themselves to a position of superiority that surveys the codes. Because to have a position is taken to mean a position *within the code*, an attempt at description of the rhetoric's and strategies is substituted for substantive positions. This retreat to the meta-level has all the attributes of ancient scepticism - the sceptic does not affirm but describes, does not take sides but balances opinions against each other.

It is interesting to note one common figure - the Bad Binary. A text is condemned if it posits an opposition between two positions and then affirms one side of the opposition. *In contrast*, a Bad Binary Analyst is dominated by a fixated epistemological stance. Feyerabend remarks that epistemological anarchism results from applying the sceptic's method (balancing the binaries) to the sceptical position itself (opportunistic immersion in the ocean of alternatives).

Such critical Dandyism, "keeping up with the play of the signifier", can lead to the extreme position of Genealogical Empiricism. Confusing the death of the Code with the death of Theory, such a position would describe a historical succession of rhetorics and strategies. Unlike a pluralist (such as Feyerabend) who would allow us to learn from the past, to actively use ideas from the history of a subject, Genealogical Empiricism goes in for endless histories of discourses and strategies which allows it to signify its own distance from the objects of its regard. At the same time, in order to signify "relevance" (perhaps even "practice"), Genealogical Empiricism deals in discourses and strategies in which the analyst plays a central, and therefore supposedly cognitively privileged, role.

10. The Librarian: from Semiotics to Epistemology

F walks through the bookshop and reads everything. He has analysed each

an F-number and its name on a card and it goes away.

Semiotics make's certain discoveries - such as theory ladenness of observation and categories, the constructed nature of meaning, the efficacy of form on content. It discovers language as use, pragmatics, linguistic function, rhetoric. it begins to form a thought adequate to pluralities, without foundations, not bound to any fixed method.

The initial bias towards a science of rhetoric's is checked by the discovery of rhetoric's in science, that is, the project becomes self-reflexive. Instead of the science of texts we have an "analytic" of rhetoric's, structures, strategies, apparata.

These notions are directed towards a new consensus: a referred epistemological stance of seeing-through. *To name is to refute. To catalogue is to exorcise. To document is to go beyond.* The librarian does not take sides.

The *pathos* of this position is parasitic on Marxism (natural science is O.K., mysticism is silly, the past is obsolete [thus we *document* our past, we name our historical art positions], practice is in) plus a self-congratulation "We have gone beyond Marxism".

We need to understand semiotics by comparing it to a type of thought ("Pluralism") that starts from the same discoveries and a similar rhetoric but does not lead to the same dead-ends: genealogical empiricism.

11. The City-dweller: Warhol, the man without qualities

W walks all through the city getting to know each street from every direction, learning to find his way about. He investigates everywhere and discounts nothing. He makes rough sketches of the areas and of the games played there without trying to interfere. If you get lost he will show you the way out. In knowing all of the city, he finds peace.

The city-dweller hyper-conforms to the Code. We have seen briefly, how values, as described by Baudrillard are becoming undecidable in society- that the era of simulation, of conforming, of simulating undecidable values are imminent.

Goods, including art-works and processes, performances, and their criticisms are consumed in terms of this universalization of local concepts like "freshly squeezed orange juice" - it is the universal concept which is consumed and not its local use. The realm of judgement does not come into play after the flashgun; the universalisation. (And indeed, the *art catalogue*, the *exhibition catalogue*, is indeed the demonstration of this very fetish or obsession with the flashgun image, all local activities of art, and there is a question now of whether they actually existed at all in material form, once and for all transformed into page after page of universal 'truth referents' - the exorcism of the librarian).

Because we live in this era of simulation and duplication, (of simulacra referring and reflecting to one another), one strategy in Baudrillard's terms, is to drive this reflection and duplication *to its limit*, simulacra reflecting

This designation; Warhol, is concerned not with codifying and generating signs which fit into any hidden system - a strategy of conformity, but rather (an exercise of) the simulacra at work. There is a fascination with this designation which is bright and shiny, a mirror which continually loses itself with its simulacra. And this first announced itself in *Lonesome Cowboys* where Duchampian evasion was discarded, in substitution, like the old factory, as they were all Catholics, a grace received through (the recognition of immortalization on film (which is not death))¹¹. In the same way, when once Warhol was regarded as the mirror - today we can talk of this designation, Warhol not in terms of the mirror, (which belongs to the discourse of representation - "the mirror of capitalism, of exchange of value" etc.), as this constituted a functional value, a divine purpose to this designation, but rather, an implosion into the mirror, a fascination with the mirror to the degree of pure difference.

Now, the entourage of the '60s from the old Factory is replaced by employees, commercial comedies replace "art movies", the old Factory replaced by the new exclusive Art Deco Office - this could be seen in terms of hyper-conforming to the code of political economy and the simulacrum of power.

In the course of describing this designation - Warhol - in art criticism, the main problems arise out of attempts to subject this designation, through the metaphysics of identity, into a full positive definition. And one can imagine a description of Warhol intimately related with the 'aesthetics of silence' - that Warhol 'himself is the modern condition of this aesthetics. Writers in describing Warhol exemplify this designation with binaries as mirror/real, vitality/passivity, power/powerless, fame/insignificance (Andy Warhol/Andrew Warhola) presence/elsewhere. "The Warhol machine is "off" yet "on", but is evasive and the 'on' "must be" elsewhere, thus the silence produces a space of unlegitimized authority "etc." "last of the dandies". Yet from a non-subjectivist view, Warhol is the binaries, the machine, after the shots from Solanis, Warhol "is T.V."

From this point of view, this evasive 'elsewhereness' as a form of description of this designation belongs to the anthropocentric element of the code. Indeed there is nothing obscure about Warhol, if anything, it is the 'boundless monotony' which pairs with the anthropocentric discourse to create a problem in language.

Foucault,¹² borrowing the distinction between thinking and intelligence from Heidegger, sites a case for thinking's confrontation with stupidity (since intelligence cannot respond to stupidity, as it is "stupidity already vanquished") and it was Warhol who he used as an example that in "being acategorical, Warhol affirms "marvellous multiplicity of differences" . "But will it all come down to the same-thing - black stupidity?" - the reminder comes in Foucault's opinion of a confrontation, a total immersion with stupidity, so as its actions 'are mimed in the abandonment of oneself - with nothing at the centre of this boundless monotony - we fall into sudden illumination of multiplicity. But all this need not be conflated with what Sontag declared in *The Aesthetics of Silence* as the 'spirit' of contemporary

11. For a more detailed account of this, see *Stargazer* (Andy Warhol's World and His Films) by Stephen Koch, Calder and Boyars, London 1973.

12. In 'Theatrum Philosophicum' in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, Ithaca, 1977, p.189.



Andy Warhol, 'Liza Minnelli', 1978 and 'Leo Castelli, 11)', 1975 (from *Portraits of the '70's*)

art, which indeed foresaw Minimalism and other forms of reductionism such as extreme versions of conceptual art. After all, Sontag's conception seems to see the silence as a spiritual enterprise, an act of transcendence. And the silence may even become an *image* of the transcendent act. This *image* of the transcendental act is the movement *via* negation, as seen previously" it is the dandyistic view that the death of the Code, of meaning, of art and culture results in *no* codes, thus the positive identity, 'artist' must be placed in the empty space of transcendence. Indeed the positing of an identity, an artist, a Code, all these singularities to add on top of that Warhol's own claim in interviews that he only ever wanted to do One painting¹³ reduced the art process into a simple binary of *having a Code / its destruction therefore transcendence* situation.

However, this text is a depthless face - and in this sense, writing about Andy Warhol as an identity could in a sense be an absurdity created by notions of representation,¹⁴

The implosive strategy has taken on various modes in the collection of Warholian images - with the early images, the soup cans, the dollar bills, the fascination with numbers as an erasing device of meaning and content is later substituted by the flash, and with the images *Liza Minnelli* '78 (from the *Portraits of the '70s*), the *Golden Marilyn* '80 (the negative flash); there is a fascination by the metaphysics of truths and identity -the same thing happens if we trace back to *Dejeuner sur l'herbe* or *Olympia*, or forward to the empty canvases.

13. The Forest-dweller: the Hermit, work and craft

As H walks through the Black Forest he leaves the well-trod paths and begins to stroll in new regions. His thoughts no longer stick to the code, but wander everywhere in meditation. He roams all through the forest and gets to know all the inhabitants and what they think. He cares for them enough to listen to their stories without standing back and graphing it all.

Beaubourg's willingness to accept any norms or values opens up a pluralism which accepts even the conception of art as having cognitive features. However, this readily accepted view can lead to a form of 'research' which bases itself on or is delimited by, functionalism, on intelligence. In accepting pluralism too hastily (in terms of social values, moralities etc.), it is easy to let the cognitive nature of art to conform and be overdetermined by scientism - which brings along with it distinctions such as rationality/irrationality, theoretical and practical research, historicity, superlatives¹⁵ etc. Chauvinistic

13. Art News interview 1974 May p.26

14. Even in "From A to B and Back Again" The Philosophy of Andy Warhol (Picador, 1975) it is merely an exchange between "B and I"

15. The bewitchment by the scientific attitude is indeed the area Wittgenstein attempted to Clarify in his "Lectures on Aesthetics", the lectures were devoted to the clarification of aesthetics in relation to the aestheticism of scientism, notions of superlatives and its 'bewitchment' in logical thinking, the seeming incontrovertibility of certain ways of thinking, the charm of rigorous systematicity, causality etc. It is worth noting that the primary concern of the Lectures is the clarification of the misunderstanding of Aesthetics as a study which does not lie only in a dissolution of, for example, the metaphysical problem of attempts at defining the 'nature' of art, the code (Art as "imitation", "expression". "form" etc.), but in the significant role aesthetics play in life.



Gerard Titus-Carmel, Excerpts from 127 drawings of the series, *The Pocket-Sized Tlingit Coffin*, June 1975 to July 1976 (from the catalogue published by the Musée National d'Art Moderne, Centre Georges Pompidou.)

scientism in art processes takes the form of analysis and theoretical justifications (e.g. in the Lacanian Psychoinstallation, the "facade" and "Fente" by Luca Maria Patella, Venice Biennale 1980), or in the realm of uses of photography, even the early works of Dibbets, for example, came close to such functionalism - to treat the photo-image as a chess piece, the photo-image 'out there' to be manipulated to form new visual paradoxes is indeed very different to, say, Mondrian's understanding of colour, what it means to *be* that medium.¹⁷

Heidegger's distinction between thinking and intelligence is a move to see the rift to authentic thinking with inauthentic functional conception of the world. In functionalism, objects are matter, they are handy pieces of equipment for the *artist* and in this sense didactic art and Realism correspond with this conception. Heidegger opts for a sense of "letting-be" of the art object thus the work comes into being, it is a condition of illumination and unveiling. It is our "standing within the openness of what is that happens in the work" (*Origin of the Work of Art*). This reaches beyond the notion of objects being 'self-referential', for 'what-is' is not an identity, it is a 'coming-to-be', a 'rift'. In relation to the code, the work could go beyond itself being its own 'truth referent'. The work is not in absolute isolation, the differing worlds of art objects and processes are not necessarily one of total ontological incommensurability. Heidegger posits the work of art as a rival between 'world' and 'earth'. The different worlds of art processes are attempts at 'disturbing the serenity of the earth' (the soil, as opposed to matter), to reach out of the familiar, to "set up a world and set forth the earth". But setting up of a "world", is not an attempt at a metaphysical territorialization of a certain space amongst other 'worlds'; it is not a code. This rival is not seen in absolutist and chauvinistic terms of the world over the earth, but that the rival itself is transient and finite - it is a discord *and* an equilibrium, a "translucency" between "earth and world".¹⁹ It is through the craft, the work-pleasure to

16. Especially in "The Dutch Mountain Stories" 1971, "Land Sea Horizon 0°-135°" 1972 and "The Comet Series" 1973.
17. As Dibbets has been compared on the formal level with Mondrian - see B. Reise, 'Notes¹ on Jan Dibbet's² Contemporary³ Nature⁴ if Realistic⁵ Classicism⁶ in the Dutch⁷ Tradition⁸' *Studio International*, Vol.183 No. 945, (1972).
18. Rather than a "transparency" (realism) or "opacity" (materiality).
19. "The equilibrium in translucence between earth and the worked world of the art object on the one hand and the "rift" or "oppositional" elements on the other as the equilibrium in translucence between the worked world of the art object and the extra-artistic world at large. That is, translucence permits the meaning and significance of the extra-artistic world to "light across" or "light through" and thereby "light up" the world of the art object. Yet the art object neither refracts these values and meanings without "distortion" nor does its translucence reflect them entire. Rather, the art object in virtue of its translucence is like a "dome of many coloured glass" which "strains the white radiance" (not of any eternity or of Being) but of the extra-artistic world whatever and however that may be perceived. This is accomplished only because in the art object the materiality of its vehicles, the earthly element, becomes an entrapment of the extra-artistic world by way of erecting a "rival" world of its own. At the same time the corporeal element seems to "rival" its own worked world and may seem to stand forth as the work alone, while the world thereby constructed withdraws into the background, indeed, passes through the sensuous vehicle altogether. Yet the corporeality of the art object can only show itself for what it is in a worked world thus constituted. (In Mondrian's "Red Amaryllis with Blue Background"). The red of the amaryllis is only its own red when opened up into the world

which the designation 'artist' immerses itself, that this coming-to-be is realized. And of course, the craft-process is present in any medium.

14. Gerard Titus-Carmel: the hermit craftsman.

The hermit responds to the death of the code with a gesture of mourning and isolation. Carefully he goes over images of death and decay rendering them with a perfectionist delight in craftsmanship. But the work of cultural mourning, this progressive detachment of the hermit from all the cultural contents is accompanied by the discovery of the craft itself as value. By an impersonal immersion in the craft, the hermit comes to *mourn the myth of his own subjectivity*, the death of the artist.

The work of Gerard Titus-Carmel shows this possibility of the hermit's craft to lead in the same direction as Beaubourg. His obsession with corruption and annihilation, with deterioration, is transmuted into a concern with the transforming powers of the artist's craft. Changes in scale (e.g. the *Pocket Size Tlingit Coffin*.) and from one medium to another (e.g. from illustrated book to pictorial exhibition to film with *Joaquin 's Love Affair*) a readiness to go from image to object as well as object to image - all this involves a mourning of the object as model or (as in Titus-Carmel's use of the series) as paradigm. (Hence Derrida's use of the notion of thanatography in describing the series of 127 views of the *Pocket Size Tlingit Coffin*).

Just as the city-dweller hyperconforms to the image, allowing any means, so the hermit hyperconforms to the craft, allowing any image.

Following Heidegger, we may describe the hermit's craft as more 'primal' than the Code -but only if we do not understand 'primal' in terms of the Code as prior in order of time or in order of justification. What is primal calls into question our everyday reality, the ordinary interpretations. In this sense, the city-dweller is just as primal as the hermit.

Article from *Lebenswalk* a work in progress by Terry Blake and John Young.

Of this work; and the world of this work, which is brought forth by, and into this red can only be achieved in showing as earth. Thus the "rift-design" is the tenuous equilibrium maintained by the translucence of the art object between earth and world, medium and message, corporeality and spirituality, and between the worked and extra-artistic worlds which converge and yet oppose each other in the work." from Leon Rosenstein's 'The Ontological Integrity of the Art Object from the Ludic Viewpoint' *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. Vol.XXXIV 1976 No. 3.

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